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Part 2 My colleague, Prince Varma, Senior Client Partner — Portfolio Growth and Client Management, shares his advice on the best practices for portfolio risk management in these trying times. Boy; this is an interesting time. Banks today are at a critical threshold — the biggest question that they are trying to answer is, "How do we continue to grow — or at least avoid contracting — without sacrificing profitability or credit quality?” The urge to overcompensate, or engage in ultra conservative lending practices, must be resisted. That said, we are already seeing a trend in which mid-sized and regional lenders are abandoning mid-tier credit. This vacuum is being filled by community banks and credit unions which are implementing aggressive risk-based pricing programs in order to target the small business market. These organizations are also introducing "safe and secure" campaigns that specifically target existing clients of banks in the news — and attempting to entice those clients to switch over. We are strongly urging banks to engage in an analysis of their existing portfolios in order to pinpoint opportunities for expanding their relationships with existing key clients. Many senior executives are expressing apprehension about undertaking new projects given current levels of uncertainty. Our best advice is two-fold.. First, focus on identifying those areas where process remediation will have long term and sustained value. Second, do not allow uncertainty to paralyze your internal improvement efforts. Strong business cases lead to good decisions; don't let fear and apprehension cloud what you know needs to be done.

By: Tom Hannagan Part 2 This post continues my discussion of the reasons for going through the time and trouble to analyze risk-based pricing for loans. For the discussion of the key elements involved in risk-adjusted loan pricing, please visit my earlier posts. In my last blog we discussed reason number one: good corporate governance. Governance, or responsible and disciplined leadership, makes a lot of sense and promotes trust and confidence which has been missing lately in many large financial institutions. The results can be seen in the market in multiples now and are associated with both the struggling companies and, through guilt by association, the rest of the industry. But, let’s move beyond the “soft” reason. The second major justification for going through the effort to risk-adjust loan pricing as a normal part of the lending function is financial. Profit performance By financial, we mean profit performance or bottom line earnings. This reason relies on the key belief that risk has a cost. Just because risk can be difficult to measure and/or is not addressed within GAAP, doesn’t mean it can’t ultimately cost you something. If, for any reason, you believe you can get away with taking on any unmitigated risk without it ever costing anything, do not continue reading this or any of my other posts. You are wasting your valuable time. Risk will surface The saying that “risk will out,” I believe, is true. The question is not if risk will eventually surface, but when, how and how hard it will bite. Risk can be transferred (hedges, swaps and so on), but it doesn’t disappear from the universe. Once risk is created, someone owns it. The news headlines of the past 18 months are replete with stories of huge writedowns of toxic assets. The securitized assets and/or their collateral loans always contained risk – from the moment the underlying loan was closed. The loans and their payment streams were sliced a dozen ways, repackaged and resold. The risk was also sliced up, but like mercury, it all remained in the system. Another familiar casino saying that brings this to mind is: “If you don’t know who the ‘mark’ at the table is, it’s you.” There are now several world class examples of such marks. Some have now failed completely and many more would have without federal intervention. Lending, in the leveraged/banking sense, involves all major types of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. And, beyond the identifiable and potentially insurable portions of these risks, like any business, it includes the risk of unexpected loss, which needs to be covered by capital. Banks have developed policies and guidelines to mitigate, identify and measure many of their risks. These all fall under the world of risk management and these efforts all cost something. There is no free way to offset risk – other than not doing the loan at all. But lending is the business of banking, isn’t it? Further, the risk mitigation efforts cost more or less depending on the various risk characteristics of the bank’s loan portfolio each loan. For instance, a floating rate loan involves little market risk and requires little if any expense to offset. A five-year fixed rate, interest-only loan involves a lot of market risk and that costs something to offset. Alternatively, a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘2’ involves a much lower likelihood of defaulting than a loan with a pass risk rating of ‘4’. The lower risk loan; therefore, involves less of an ALLL (Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses) reserve and provisioning expense. Also, an owner occupied commercial mortgage is normally much less expensive to monitor than a credit backing a floor plan or construction project. Those cost differences could be reflected in the pricing. Finally, for today, the amount of risk capital needed to back these kinds of differing loan characteristics, for purposes of unexpected loss, is substantially different. If these kinds of differences are not priced into the loans somehow, one of two situations exists: Either the bank is not getting paid for the risk it is incurring; or, If it is, it is charging the lower risk borrowers a rate that pays for added risk-adjusted expenses of the higher risk borrowers. The business risk to the bank then becomes losing the better clients over time in lieu of attracting the riskier deals. This process has a name: adverse selection. The ongoing expenses of risk mitigation and the negative impact of unexpected losses on retained earnings, over time, materially hurt the bank’s earnings. Someone is paying for all of the risks of being in the business of lending and it’s usually one of two groups: the customers or the shareholders. In the worst of cases, it’s also the taxpayers. The idea of risk-based pricing, at the loan level, is to have the clients pay for the risks the bank is incurring on their behalf by pricing the loan appropriately from the beginning. As a result: This tends to protect, and often enhance, the bank’s financial performance; It is clever; It puts some teeth in the bank’s already existing risk management policies; It is justifiable to the client; and It even makes sense to most lending officers. Fortunately, loan pricing analysis is a scalable activity and possible for most any size bank. It is a smarter way of banking than a one-size-fits-all approach — even without considering the governance improvement.

By: Tom Hannagan Part 1 In my last three posts, we have covered the key parts of how risk-based loan pricing works. We have discussed how the key foundational elements involved in risk-adjusted loan pricing can and should relate to the bank’s accounting results and strategic policies. We went from the pricing analysis of an individual loan on a risk-adjusted basis to solving for a bank-wide target or guideline return. We also mentioned how this analysis can be expanded to the client relationship level, both producing a relationship management view of any existing loans and the impact of pricing a renewal or new credit to impact the client-level return. Finally, I mentioned that although this capability can exist (and does in more banks than ever before), it isn’t an easy undertaking in an industry that is historically keyed to volume goals rather than transaction profit (let alone risk-adjusted profit). So, why go through the effort? Moving to a risk-adjusted view of lending and relationship management requires serious thought, effort and resolve. It involves change and teaching lenders a new trick. It even suggests that the lending executive (perhaps the next president of the bank) hasn’t been doing the best job possible to protect and advance the bank’s margins. Any new undertaking involves management risk. And, accurate or not, bank executives are not generally viewed as terrific change agents. Is this concept of risk-based pricing worth all the time and trouble? We think so – for two general reasons. Corporate governance Almost any business, if not any undertaking of any kind, involves risk to some degree. Finance in general, and commercial banking, specifically, involves several kinds of risk. The most obvious risk is repayment or credit risk. Banks have been lending money successfully for a long time. The funny thing is that often, when we’ve studied the actual loan rates of a bank’s portfolio versus the bank’s own risk ratings (or risk grades), we see almost no difference in loan pricing. The banks have credit policies that discuss the different ratings in some detail. And, the banks usually have some sort of provisioning process or ALLL (Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses) logic that uses these differences in risk rating. Loan review guidelines often use the differences in risk rating to gauge the review frequency and depth. So, the banks know what’s going on. They know that a higher risk borrower/loan is less likely to be repaid in full than a lower credit risk borrower/loan. But, the lending operation goes on as if they were all about the same. There seems to be a disconnect (kind of like when my arms and brain disconnect when I swing a golf club). I know if I slow down I’ll hit a better shot, but I still swing way too fast. It seems to me that since the bank has all of these terrific policies in place dealing with credit risk, that good governance would require that credit risk be reflected more fully when loans are marketed, negotiated and agreed to – rather than just when they go awry. I would make the same general argument for management consistency associated with other risk types. If the loan duration is longer, good governance would reflect (pay for) a realistic marginal funding cost of the same duration. This would help to align the loan pricing effort with the guidelines or policies associated with ALCO or Asset and Liability Policy Committee and Interest Rate Risk (IRR) management. If a loan involves higher or lower risk of unexpected loss based on loan/collateral type and risk rating, then the risk capital associated with the loan should vary accordingly. The risk-based allocation of capital will then require different pricing in order for the loan to hit a targeted return. This protection of return, on a risk-adjusted basis, is the final step in good governance – in this case, to protect the shareholders specific contribution (of their equity) to funding the loan in question. Finally, if I were a director, regulator or an auditor (again), and I reviewed all of these fine policies related to risk management, and did not see them reflected in deal pricing, I would have to ask “why?”. It would seem that either executive management doesn’t really believe in their own policies, or they are willing to set them aside when negotiating deals for the added business. Maybe loan management doesn’t want to be bothered by the policies while they’re out there in the “real world” fighting for added loan volume. Either way, there seems to be a governance disconnect. Which I know on the golf course, leads to lost balls and unnecessary poor scores. My second major reason will follow in my next blog.
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