By: Staci Baker With the increase in consumer behaviors such as ‘strategic default’, it has become increasingly difficult during the past few years for lenders to determine who the most creditworthy consumers are – defining consumers with the lowest credit risk. If you define risk as ‘the likelihood of [a consumer] becoming 90 days or more past due’, the findings are alarming. From June 2007 to June 2009, Super Prime consumers (those scoring 900 or higher) in the U.S. have gone from an average  VantageScore® credit score* of 945 to 918, which increased their risk level  from approx. 0.12% to 0.62% – an increase of 417% for this highly sought after population!  Prime and near prime risk levels increased by 400% and 96% respectively.  Whereas subprime consumers with few choices (stay subprime or improve their score), saw a slight decrease in risk, 8% – increasing their average VantageScore® credit score from 578 to 599. So how do lenders determine who to lend to, when the risk level for all credit tiers increases, or remain risky?  In today’s dynamic economy, lenders need tools that will give them an edge, and allow them to identify consumer trends quickly.  Incorporating analytic tools, like Premier Attributes, into lender’s origination models, will allow them to pinpoint specific consumer behavior, and provide segmentation through predefined attribute sets that are industry specific and target profitable accounts to improve acquisition strategies. As risk levels change, maintaining profitability becomes more difficult due to shrinking eligible consumer pools.  By adding credit attributes, assessing credit risk both within an organization and for new accounts will be simplified and allow for more targeted prospects, thus maximizing prospecting strategies across the customer lifecycle and helping to increase profitability. * VantageScore®, LLC, May, 2010, “Finding Creditworthy Consumers in a Changing Economic Climate”  

We've blogged about fraud alerts, fraud analytics, fraud models and fraud best practices. Sometimes, though, we delude ourselves into thinking that fraud prevention strategies we put into place today will be equally effective over time.  Unfortunately, when a rat finds a dead-end in a previously-learned maze, it just keeps hunting for an exit.  Fraudsters are no different.  Ideally we want to seal off all the exits, and teach the rats to go and do something productive with their lives, but sadly that is not always the case.  We also don't want to let too many good consumers get stuck either, so we cannot get too trigger-happy with our fraud best practices. Fraud behavior is dynamic, not static.  Fraudsters learn and adapt to the feedback they receive through trial and error.  That means when you plug a hole in your system today, there will be an increased push to seek out other holes tomorrow.  This underscores the importance of keeping a close eye on your fraudsters' behavior trends. But there must be some theoretical breaking point where the fraudsters simply give up trying–at least with your company.  This behavioral extinction may be idealistic in the general sense, but is nonetheless a worthy goal as related to your business.  One of the best things you can do to prevent fraud is to gain a reputation amongst the fraudsters of, "Don't even try, it's not even worth it."  And even if you don't succeed in getting them to stop trying altogether, it's still satisfying to know you are lowering their ROI while improving yours  

I recently attended a conference where Credit Union managers spoke of the many changes facing their industry in the wake of the real estate crisis and economic decline that has impacted the US economy over the past couple of years.  As these managers weighed in on the issues facing their businesses today, several themes began to emerge – tighter lending standards & risk management practices, increased regulatory scrutiny, and increased competition resulting in tighter margins for their portfolios. Across these issues, another major development was discussed – increased Credit Union mergers and acquisitions. As I considered the challenges facing these lenders, and the increase in M&A activity, it occurred to me that these lenders might have a common bond with an unexpected group –American family farms.  Overall, Credit Unions are facing the challenge of adding significant fixed costs (more sophisticated lending platforms & risk management processes) all the while dealing with increased competition from lenders like large banks and captive automotive lenders.  This challenge is not unlike the challenges faced by the family farm over the past few decades – small volume operators having to absorb significant fixed costs from innovation & increased corporate competition, without the benefit of scale to spread these costs over to maintain healthy lending margins. Without the benefit of scale, the family farm basically disappeared as large commercial operators acquired less-efficient (and less profitable) operators. Are Credit Unions entering into a similar period of competitive disadvantage? It appears that the Credit Union model will have to adjust in the very near future to remain viable. With high infrastructure expectations, many credit unions will have to develop improved decisioning strategies, become more proficient in assessing credit risk –implementing risk-based pricing models, and executing more efficient operational processes in order to sustain themselves when the challenges of regulation and infrastructure favor economies of scale. Otherwise, they are facing an uphill challenge, just as the family farm did (and does); to compete and survive in a market that favors the high-volume lender.