All posts by Guest Contributor
By: Kari Michel Are you using scores to make new applicant decisions? Scoring models need to be monitored regularly to ensure a sound and successful lending program. Would you buy a car and run it for years without maintenance -- and expect it to run at peak performance? Of course not. Just like oil changes or tune-ups, there are several critical components that need to be addressed regarding your scoring models on a regular basis. Monitoring reports are essential for organizations to answer the following questions: • Are we in compliance? • How is our portfolio performing? • Are we making the most effective use of your scores? To understand how to improve your portfolio performance, you must have good monitoring reports. Typically, reports fall into one of three categories: (1) population stability, (2) decision management, (3) scorecard performance. Having the right information will allow you to monitor and validate your underwriting strategies and make any adjustments when necessary. Additionally, that information will let you know that your scorecards are still performing as expected. In my next blog, I will discuss the population stability report in more detail.
By: Tracy Bremmer It’s not really all about the credit score. Now don’t get me wrong, a credit score is a very important tool used in credit decision making; however there’s so much more that lenders use to say “accept” or “decline.” Many lenders segment their customer/prospect base prior to ever using the score. They use credit-related attributes such as, “has this consumer had a bankruptcy in the last two years?” or “do they have an existing mortgage account?” to segment out consumers into risk-tier buckets. Lenders also evaluate information from the application such as income or number of years at current residence. These types of application attributes help the lender gain insight that is not typically evaluated in the traditional risk score. For lenders who already have a relationship with a customer, they will look at their existing relationships with that customer prior to making a decision. They’ll look at things like payment history and current product mix to better understand who best to cross-sell, up-sell, or in today’s economy, down-sell. In addition, many lenders will run the applicant through some type of fraud database to ensure the person really is who they say they are. I like to think of the score as the center of the decision, with all of these other metrics as necessary inputs to the entire decision process. It is like going out for an ice cream sundae and starting with the vanilla and needing all the mix-ins to make it complete.
-- By Kari Michel What is your credit risk score? Is it 300, 700, 900 or something in between? In order to understand what it means, you need to know which score you are referencing. Lenders use many different scoring models to determine who qualifies for a loan and at what interest rate. For example, Experian has developed many scores, such as VantageScore®. Think of VantageScore® as just one of many credit scores available in the marketplace. While all credit risk models have the same purpose, to use credit information to assess risk, each credit model is unique in that each one has its own proprietary formula that combines and calculates various credit information from your credit report. Even if lenders used the same credit risk score, the interpretation of risk depends on the lender, and their lending policies and criteria may vary. Additionally, each credit risk model has its own score range as well. While the score range may be relatively similar to another score range, the meaning of the score may not necessarily be the same. For example, a 640 in one score may not mean the same thing or have the same credit risk as a 640 for another score. It is also possible for two different scores to represent the same level of risk. If you have a good credit score with one lender, you will likely have a good score with other lenders, even if the number is different.
By: Tom Hannagan As I\'m preparing for traveling to the Baker Hill Solution Summit next week, I thought I would revisit the ideas of risk-based loan pricing. Risk Adjusted Loan Pricing – The Major Parts I have referred to risk-adjusted commercial loan pricing (or the lack of it) in previous posts. At times, I’ve commented on aspects of risk-based pricing and risk-based bank performance measurement, but I haven’t discussed what risk-based pricing is -- in a comprehensive manner. Perhaps, I can begin to do that now, and in my next posts. Risk-based pricing analysis is a product-level microcosm of risk-based bank performance. You begin by looking at the financial implications of a product sale from a cost accounting perspective. This means calculating the revenues associated with a loan, including the interest income and any fee-based income. These revenues need to be spread over the life of the loan, while taking into account the amortization characteristics of the balance (or average usage for a line of credit). To save effort (and in providing good client relationship management), we often download the balance and rate information for existing loans from a bank’s loan accounting system. To “risk-adjust” the interest income, you need to apply a cost of funds that has the same implied market risk characteristics as the loan balance. This is not like the bank’s actual cost of funds for several reasons. Most importantly, there is usually no automatic risk-based matching between the manner in which the bank makes loans and the term characteristics of its deposits and/or borrowing. Once we establish a cost of funds approach that removes interest rate risk from the loan, we subtract the risk-adjusted interest expense from the revenues to arrive at risk-adjusted net interest income, or our risk-adjusted gross margin. We then subtract two types of costs. One cost includes the administrative or overhead expenses associated with the product. Our best practice is to derive an approach to operating expense breakdowns that takes into account all of the bank’s non-interest expenses. This is a “full absorption” method of cost accounting. We want to know the marginal cost of doing business, but if we just apply the marginal cost to all loans, a large portion of real-life expenses won’t be covered by resulting pricing. As a result, the bank’s profits may suffer. We fully understand the argument for marginal cost coverage, but have seen the unfortunate end-result of too many sales -- that use this lower cost factor -- hurt a bank’s bottom line. Administrative cost does not normally require additional risk adjustment, as any risk-based operational expenses and costs of mitigating operation risk are already included in the bank’s general ledger for non-interest expenses. The second expense subtracted from net interest income is credit risk cost. This is not the same as the bank’s provision expense, and is certainly not the same as the loss provision in any one accounting period. The credit risk cost for pricing purposes should be risk adjusted based on both product type (usually loan collateral category) and the bank’s risk rating for the loan in question. This metric will calculate the relative probability of default for the borrower combined with the loss given default for the loan type in question. We usually annualize the expected loss numbers by taking into account a multi-year history and a one- or two-year projection of net loan losses. These losses are broken down by loan type and risk rating based on the bank’s actual distribution of loan balances. The risk costs by risk rating are then created using an up-sloping curve that is similar in shape to an industry default experience curve. This assures a realistic differentiation of losses by risk rating. Many banks have loss curves that are too flat in nature, resulting in little or no price differentiation based on credit quality. This leads to poor risk-based performance metrics and, ultimately, to poor overall financial performance. The loss expense curves are fine-tuned so that over a period of years the total credit risk costs, when applied to the entire portfolio, should cover the average annual expected loss experience of the bank. By subtracting the operating expenses and credit risk loss from risk-adjusted net interest income, we arrive at risk-adjusted pre-tax income. In my next post we’ll expand this discussion further to risk-adjusted net income, capital allocation for unexpected loss and profit ratio considerations.
1. Portfolio Management – You should really focus on this topic in 2009. With many institutions already streamlining the origination process, portfolio management is the logical next step. While the foundation is based in credit quality, portfolio management is not just for the credit side. 2. Review of Data (aka “Getting Behind the Numbers”) – We are not talking about scorecard validation; that’s another subject. This is more general. Traditional commercial lending rarely maintains a sophisticated database on its clients. Even when it does, traditional commercial lending rarely analyzes the data. 3. Lowering Costs of Origination – Always a shoe-in for a goal in any year! But how does an institution make meaningful and marked improvements in reducing its costs of origination? 4. Scorecard Validation – Getting more specific with the review of data. Discuss the basic components of the validation process and what your institution can do to best prepare itself for analyzing the results of a validation. Whether it be an interim validation or a full-sized one, put together the right steps to ensure your institution derives the maximum benefit from its scorecard. 5. Turnaround Times (Response to Client) –Rebuild it. Make the origination process better, stronger and faster. No; we aren’t talking about bionics here -- nor how you can manipulate the metrics to report a faster turnaround time. We are talking about what you can do from a loan applicant perspective to improve turnaround time. 6. Training – Where are all the training programs? Send in all the training programs! Worry, because they are not here. (Replace training programs with clowns and we might have an oldies song.) Can’t find the right people with the right talent in the marketplace? 7. Application Volume/Marketing/Relationship Management – You can design and execute the most efficient origination and portfolio management processes. But, without addressing client and application volume, what good are they? 8. Pricing/Yield on Portfolio – “We compete on service, not price.” We’ve heard this over and over again. In reality, the sales side always resorts to price as the final differentiator. Utilizing standardization and consistency can streamline your process and drive improved yields on your portfolio. 9. Management Metrics – How do I know that I am going in the right direction? Strategize, implement, execute, measure and repeat. Learn how to set your targets to provide meaningful bottom line results. 10. Operational Risk Management – Different from credit risk, operational risk and its management, operational risk management deals with what an institution should do to make sure it is not open to operational risk in the portfolio. Items totally in the control of the institution, if not executed properly, can cause significant loss. What do you think? As the end of April approaches, are these still hot topics in your financial institution?
The debate continues in the banking industry -- Do we push the loan authority to the field or do we centralize it (particularly when we are talking about small business loans)? A common argument for sending the loan authority to the field is the improved turnaround time for the applicant. However reality is that centralized loan authority actually provides a decision time almost two times faster than those of a decentralized nature. The statistics supporting this fact are from the Small Business Benchmark Study created and published by Baker Hill, a Part of Experian, for the past five years. Based upon the 2008 Small Business Benchmark Study, those institutions with assets of $20 billion to $100 billion used only centralized underwriting and provided decisions within 2.5 days on average. In contrast, the next closest category ($2 billion to $20 billion in assets) took 4.4 days. Now, if we only consider the time it takes to make a decision (meaning we have all the information needed), the same disparity exists. The largest banks using solely centralized underwriting took 0.8 days to make a decision, while the next tier ($2 billion to $20 billion) took an average 1.5 days to make a decision. This drop in centralized underwriting usage between these two tiers was simply a 15 percent change. This means that the $20 billion to $100 billion banks had 100% usage of centralized underwriting while the $2 billion to $20 billion dropped only to 85% usage. Eighty-five percent is still a strong usage percentage, but it has a significant impact on turnaround time. The most perplexing issue is that the smaller community banks are consistently telling me that they feel their competitive advantages are that they can respond faster and they know their clients better than bigger, impersonal banks. Based upon the stats, I am not seeing this competitive advantage supported by reality. What is particularly confusing is that the small community banks, that are supposed to be closest to the client, take twice as long overall from application receipt to decision and almost three times as long when you compare them to the $20 billion to $100 billion category (0.8 days) to the $500 million to $2 billion category (2.2 days). As you can see - centralized underwriting works. It is consistent, provides improved customer service, improved throughput, increased efficiency and improved credit quality when compared to the decentralized approach. In future blogs, I will address the credit quality component.
By: Tom Hannagan Beyond the financial risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital, which would be directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk. We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. Business risk includes a variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making, corporate governance considerations, executive behavior (for better or worse), management succession events (Apple and Steve Jobs, for instance) or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business. Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a roughly 20 percent infusion of added tier one capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department says it does not seek voting rights, but none-the-less has gotten them in at least some cases. The real “kicker” is embedded in the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form. The most interesting clause, that appears to represent a very open-ended business risk to management decision making, is one relatively small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York). Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My reading of this is that if in the future Congress enacts anything that Treasury finds applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to go along. Regardless of whether the Treasury negotiates any voting rights, once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what is in the document to begin with, it is subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government. As a result, many banks have said no thank you to TARP. At least four banks have recently paid back $340 million to repurchase the government’s shares. And, apparently another bank has offered to pay back $1 billion but, according to Andrew Napolitano at Fox Business Channel, the offer was turned down and the bank was threatened with adverse consequences if it persisted in its attempt to get out. More pointed and public, and much larger in size, is the dance taking place now between Chrysler Corporation, Fiat, the UAW, four lead lenders and, you guessed it, the federal government. The secured loans in question total almost $7 billion and the government wants J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citicorp and Morgan Stanley to exchange $5 billion of the loans for Chrysler stock. The banks know they would do better (for their shareholders) by selling off Chryslers assets. This is an example of why bankruptcy exists. The stakes are large and so is the business risk of the influence from the government. It will be interesting to see how things turn out. So, this new major owner does have a voice. If Congress wants certain lending volumes or terms, or they want certain compensation levels, it needs to be enacted into federal law. Short of having to pass a law, there is the implied threat of the big stick in the TARP agreement. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.
This post continues the feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Mark Sofietti, Associate Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. In today’s market, the banking industry seems to be changing at a very rapid pace. The current crisis that we are in, as an industry and as a nation, is forcing institutions to revisit risk management policies and procedures to make the appropriate changes needed to remain healthy and profitable. However, the current crisis is not the only reason why institutions should focus on change management. Change management needs to be appropriately handled in bad and good times. Understanding change management is always a necessity to a well-run organization. Whether it is a reorganization, a new software system, a new policy or moving to a new building, change can cause a great deal of stress and uncertainty -- but it can also cause benefits. So, as managers, you may be asking, “What can I do to ensure that positive changes are happening within my organization? What are some of the items that I should consider when I am bringing about organizational change?” There are four necessary steps that need to be taken in order to improve the success of an initiative that is causing change to an institution. I covered two in my last post. Here are the additional steps. 3. Consider methods of change One method of change is the education of individuals about new ways of operating. This method should be used when there is more resistance to change and when individuals lack a clear understanding or knowledge of the change being made. Education may cause the implementation to take longer, but those involved will better understand the effects of the change. A second method is gathering participation from different levels and skill sets within the organizations. Building a team should be used when there is the highest risk of failure due to change resistance and when more information needs to be gathered before an effective implementation can be completed. Negotiation is a method that is used when a group or person is going to be negatively affected by the change. This method could alleviate the discomfort by giving the person or group some other benefit. Negotiations could allow an organization to avoid resistance, but it may be very costly and time consuming to implement the change. The coercion change method is when a change is implemented with little room for diversion from the plan. Employees are told what the change is going to be and they have to accept it. This method should be used when speed is of the utmost importance, or if the change is not going to be easily accepted. Most employees do not like this approach and it may cause resentment or it might cause staff members to leave. The final method of change uses manipulation, the conscious decision to share limited information about the change that is taking place. This method should only be used when no other tactic will work, or if time or cost is major issues. This approach is dangerous because it can lead to more problems in the future. 4. Create plan of action A plan should be created for the implementation of change to clearly address reservations and define the change strategy. It should include internal and external audiences who can be affected by the change. It is common to forget those who are indirectly impacted by the change -- and these audiences (customers, for example) may be the most important. Objectives of the change need to be clearly outlined in the plan in order to understand how the new future state of the organization will look and operate. The plan needs to be communicated to all those involved so that the transition can be understood and everyone can be held accountable. The plan should be periodically revisited after implementation in order to review progress. Creating a plan of action is a very important step to ensure that those who resisted the change do not revert back to their old habits. Achieving change is not an easy process, especially when time is not on your side. If you take a second look at the change that you are trying to implement and do the necessary planning, you have a greater chance for success than if you or your organization fails to fully evaluate the consequences. Effective change management should be part of any financial risk management process. Take charge of your institution’s future through a calculated approach to change management and your organization will be in a better position for the next change that is coming around the bend.
We have talked about: the creation of the vision for our loan portfolios (current state versus future state) – e.g. the strategy for moving our current portfolio to the future vision. Now comes the time for execution of that strategy. In changing portfolio composition and improving credit quality, the discipline of credit must be strong (this includes in the arenas of commercial loan origination, loan portfolio monitoring, and credit risk modeling of course). Consistency, especially, in the application of policy is key. Early on in the change/execution process there will be strong pressure to revert back to the old ways and stay in a familiar comfort zone. Credit criteria/underwriting guidelines will have indeed changed in the strategy execution. In the coming blogs we will be discussing: assessment of the current state in your loan portfolio; development of the specific strategy to effect change in the portfolio from a credit quality perspective and composition; business development efforts to affect change in the portfolio composition; and policy changes to support the strategy/vision.
By: Prince Varma Good day all. My last blog revolved around practical approaches to effective client relationship management. It time to get back to a “risk” type conversation. I recently told my wife that if I hear the phrase “…in this economic environment …” uttered as a caveat one more time, I’m going to scream. I have truly come to anticipate the beginning or introduction to interviews and articles to lead in with this sentiment and it’s driving me nuts. In these economic times (you can tell I’m from the sales side, I cleverly changed the phrase), it is clearly not business as usual within most financial institutions. Conversations with CEOs and bank presidents over the past two months have usually followed the same theme, “I’ve got money to lend, but I just can’t find a decent deal” or “I’ve got applications up the wazoo, but the quality just isn’t there.” So, what is going on? The obvious answer is that we are looking at applications more closely and the credit side (risk management guys) is deliriously happy because everytime they make a recommendation about “reviewing the opportunity further” they also don’t hesitate to mention, “in this economic environment.” Really, what is the scoop and how do we adjust on the front line? Clearly, we know that deeper reviews and management of risk is being undertaken. The problem is that the established standards are no longer valid. Yes, the basics ratios still need to be run, but let’s face it, in this economic environment a company’s historical performance is no longer an effective indicator as to their future performance. The playing field is no longer consistent. The past two to three years of financials are based on circumstances that no longer apply. This means that the analysts are having a difficult time establishing effective benchmarks from which to apply credit policy – and we know that those guys are the paragons of adaptability. We are being asked to evaluate risk in an uncertain circumstance. We are looking at projected revenues and earnings and examining receivables. We are also comparing this business to others in the industry, determining which other market segments have a direct (and indirect) impact on the performance of this one, reviewing business plans and evaluating management depth and experience. And, at the end of the day, either saying no, saying yes but not so much or holding our breath and hoping that divine intervention shows us the way. Does any of this should sound familiar to you? It should. We see these type of deals all of the time and we call them the start-ups. Ok, so what am I recommending? Quite simply, that we take a step back from our typical approach to the established business and engage with them the way we would a start-up. When an opportunity or request presents itself, restrain the urge to go down the garden path. Slow down! No... stop! Take a deep breath, put on your “economic development hat ” and approach the deal the way you would if it were a start-up (and I don’t mean running away at top speed in the opposite direction screaming). You should: look for or help them construct a short term (next four to six month) tactical action/priority plan; help them or review their 12-month business plan; o NOTE: If the business hasn’t realized that they need a short-term survival plan and a mid-term business plan… run! Run far and run fast! examine their market and have them explain why they will make it versus the competition; dig into their management expertise (think AIG); have them explain how their tactical and 12-month business plan will keep the doors open and the lights on (since its coming into summer we’ll cut them some slack on the heat); and finally review and revise their projections. If at the end of this, you still feel that the deal has legs, it probably does, and you’ve done a pretty thorough job building the business case for the credit side. Or, you could just lament that there really isn’t much out there in this economic environment.
By: Prince Varma Part 2 Two additional tactics that you should incorporate into your relationship management penetration strategy include: Conducting relationship reviews in addition to loan reviews; and Identifying and proactively monitoring changes in client behavior. Relationship reviews Relationship reviews are a comprehensive and thorough examination of the client’s business and should be the foundation for your relationship management process. They seek to provide both the client and the relationship manager with a roadmap for the upcoming 14- to 16-month period by identifying specific goals and concerns, as well as constructing a snapshot of the client today. The purpose of a relationship review is to understand the broader direction. Bluntly put, an annual loan review is not a penetration activity. Its primary focus is to verify the ongoing credit worthiness of an existing deal in the books. More details will come about this topic in a future blog. Monitoring changes in behavior Monitoring changes in client behavior through the use of “activity thresholding” is quickly becoming a mainstay in the financial industry. The idea isn’t new; however, the application of the concept to penetration is. Instead of having changes in credit score trigger an alert related to risk management and mitigation, we would instead look at thresholds related to line usage, number of deposit transactions, changes in average deposit amount and credit card transactions. These kinds of client behaviors and activities provide insight into what is occurring within a clients business and as such, allow us to provide recommendations for products and services that are meaningful and appropriate.
This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Barry Timm, Senior Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. 2008 has proven to be an unbelievably challenging year for the economy as a whole, let alone the financial industry. Never before have we experienced the type and degree of turmoil that we did in 2008, even since the “Great Depression”. These economic challenges have been quick, severe and widespread; and, from large corporations to the individual consumer, all have been impacted to some degree. The stock market is down, unemployment up, consumer confidence down, delinquencies up ….not exactly a pleasant roller coaster ride. And, there is no longer any projecting as to when the “bubble” is going to burst. It happened. Decreased real estate values have occurred not only in high impact geographic regions but throughout the country. While home equity products have traditionally been the “golden child” of consumer loan product offerings, recent economic changes have caused a shift in that perspective. As a result, tightened underwriting standards have limited the availability of the product as a whole. In some markets the product offering has even been temporarily halted. We frequently hear the terminology “bailout” being used in the news. While we all have expectations as it relates to the bailout approach, I thought I would “Google” the word “bailout” to see what would magically appear. Interestingly enough, the first listing was titled “Walk away from your home”, with a link to the home page for a mortgage default legal team. This is not exactly what I was expecting to find, but is definitely reflective of the times. And, according to the FDIC, there have been 25 failed financial instituions in the year 2008. This single year number equates to the total number of failed financial institutions between the prior periods 2001 through 2007. Okay … enough doom and gloom. In spite of all that has occurred within the economy, some financial institutions continue to maintain a strong credit quality position in their consumer portfolios and have maintained profitability throughout all of the market volatility. What are the strong survivors doing that differentiates themselves from the others? 1. They understand their portfolio. Advisory Services frequently assists clients with various types of portfolio management analysis and often presents those findings to senior management. We often hear that management is surprised by the results of that analysis. The point is that high-level management reporting is not enough these days. Additional detail and depth are necessary. More specifically, as opposed to evaluating payment performance at the portfolio level, it is important to consider the following: Do you know your delinquency numbers at the product level? How do delinquencies compare to your product approval rates? Do you routinely compare approval/decline rates and delinquencies to scorecard results and/or credit bureau scores? Do you know where pricing exceptions are being made and are you receiving sufficient return for the level of risk? 2. A focused strategy is in place. It is important to re-emphasize the specific, strategic direction and focus of your defined market. Now is not the time to be “pushing the envelope” and extending into untested waters. There is something to be said about focusing on your strengths, staying within your defined footprint and meeting the needs of your core, proven line of business while following sound financial risk management. 3. The underwriting process is under control. This does not automatically mean that a “tightening” of underwriting standards is necessary. It does mean, however, that stronger attention to detail is warranted. It is important that underwriting criteria is reviewed and that you are sure that defined underwriting practices are consistently applied. As noted in item number one above, this may require digging a little deeper and reviewing current and past decisioned loans (preferably with a critical eye of an independent third party). Assessing the underwriting process becomes increasing complex and more critical with a decentralized underwriting approach. Focus on the positive Now that 2008 is behind us, let’s continue to focus on the positives to come in 2009. Reflect on the past, but strive to center your attention on ongoing portfolio monitoring, financial risk management assessments and improvements for the future.
By: Tom Hannagan Part 6 Peer Group 2 fee income Non-interest income again, as a percent of average total assets, declined to .86 percent from .95 percent in 2007. For Peer Group 2 (PG2), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.04 percent of assets in 2005. A smaller, non-interest bearing deposit base with no other new and offsetting sources of fee income will lead to increased pressure on this metric. Operating expenses Operating expenses also put more pressure on earnings on these smaller banks. They increased from 2.79 percent to 2.83 percent of average assets. That’s four basis points on the negative. Historically, this metric has been flattering for this size bank and usually moves up or down from year-to-year. It was almost equal at 2.82 percent of assets in 2004. As a result of the sizeable decline in margins, the continued decline in fee income and the slight increase in operating expenses PG2’s efficiency ratio lost ground from 59.52 percent in 2007 to only 64.72 percent in 2008. That means that every dollar in gross revenue cost them almost 65 cents in administrative expenses this year. This metric averaged 56 cents in 2005/2006. It’s amazing how close these numbers are for banks of very different size where you would expect clear economies of scale. The total impact of margin performance, fee income and operating expenses, plus the huge increase in provision expense of 59 basis points leads us to a total decline in pre-tax operating income of .96 percent on total assets. That is a total decline from 1.58 percent pre-tax ROA in 2007 to .64 percent pre-tax ROA, a loss of 61 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007. My same conclusion as above would hold regarding the pricing of risk into bank lending (although the smaller banks didn’t perform a badly as the larger in this regard). Although all 490 banks are declining in all profit metrics, the smaller banks seem to have an edge in pricing loans, but not deposits. Although up dramatically in 2007, and even more in 2008 for both groups, the PG2 banks seem to be suffering fewer credit losses relative to their asset size than their larger brethren. Both groups have resulting huge profit declines, but the largest banks are under the most pressure through this period. An interesting point, with higher loan yields and fewer apparent losses, is whether PG2 banks are somewhat better at risk-based pricing (for whatever reason) than the largest bank group. Results are results. The 2009 numbers aren’t expected to show a lot of improvement as the general economy continues to slow and credit and financial risk management issues continue. We’ll probably comment on 2009 as the quarterlies become available this year.
By: Prince Varma Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices. So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk? Great question! The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of: client penetration/growth; client retention; and client credit risk mitigation. How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”? (this is where the sales guy stuff comes in) From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios. From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again. How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?” That should be read as … penetration and retention Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include: - evaluating the scope of the opportunity; - isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy; - determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and - being willing to let the “bad deals” walk. In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies. After all what would you expect from a business development guy…
When you begin thinking about financial risk management, you must begin with a vision for your loan portfolio and the similarity of a loan portfolio to that of an investment portfolio. Now that you have that vision in place, we can focus on the overall strategy to achieve that vision. A valuable first step in loan portfolio monitoring is to establish a targeted value by a certain time (say, our targeted retirement age). Similarly, it’s important that we establish our vision for the loan portfolio regarding overall diversification, return and the management of risk levels. The next step is to create a strategy to achieve the targeted state. By focusing on the gaps between our current state and the vision state we have created, we can develop an action plan for achieving the future/vision state. I am going to introduce some rather unique ideas here. Consider which of your portfolio segments are overweight? One that comes to mind would be the commercial real estate portfolio. The binge that has taken place over the past five plus years has resulted in an unhealthy concentration of loans in the commercial real estate segment. In this one area alone, we will face the greatest challenge of right-sizing our portfolio mix and achieving the appropriate risk model per our vision. We have to assess our overall credit risk in the portfolios next. For small business and consumer portfolios, this is relatively easy using the various credit scores that are available to assess the current risk. For the larger commercial and industrial portfolios and the commercial real estate portfolios, we must employ some more manual processes to assess risk. Unfortunately, we have to perform appropriate risk assessments (current up-to-date risk assessments) in order to move on to the next stage of this overall process (which is to execute on the strategy). Once we have the dollar amounts of either growth or divestiture in various portfolio segments, we can employ the risk assessment to determine the appropriate execution of either growth or divestiture.
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