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By: Tom Hannagan Beyond the financial risk management considerations related to a bank’s capital, which would be directly impacted by Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) participation, it should be clear that TARP also involves business (or strategic) risk. We have spoken in the past of several major categories of risk: credit risk, market risk, operational risk and business risk. Business risk includes a variety of risks associated with the outcomes from strategic decision making, corporate governance considerations, executive behavior (for better or worse), management succession events (Apple and Steve Jobs, for instance) or other leadership occurrences that may affect the performance and financial viability of the business. Aside from the monetary impact on the bank’s capital position, TARP involves a new capital securities owner being in the mix. And, with a roughly 20 percent infusion of added tier one capital, we are almost always talking about a very large, new owner relative to existing shareholders. The United States Department of the Treasury is the investor or holder of the newly issued preferred stock and warrants. The Treasury Department says it does not seek voting rights, but none-the-less has gotten them in at least some cases. The real “kicker” is embedded in the Treasury’s Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Form. The most interesting clause, that appears to represent a very open-ended business risk to management decision making, is one relatively small paragraph, named Amendment, in the middle of Article V - Miscellaneous, just ahead of governing law (which is federal law, backed up by the laws of the State of New York). Amendment begins normally enough, requiring the usual signed agreement of each party, but then states: “provided that the Investor may unilaterally amend any provision of this Agreement to the extent required to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal statutes.” Wow. My reading of this is that if in the future Congress enacts anything that Treasury finds applicable to any aspect of the previously signed TARP Agreement, the bank is bound to go along. Regardless of whether the Treasury negotiates any voting rights, once the TARP Agreement is executed by the bank, management is not only bound by what is in the document to begin with, it is subject to future federal law as long as the TARP shares are held by the government. As a result, many banks have said no thank you to TARP. At least four banks have recently paid back $340 million to repurchase the government’s shares. And, apparently another bank has offered to pay back $1 billion but, according to Andrew Napolitano at Fox Business Channel, the offer was turned down and the bank was threatened with adverse consequences if it persisted in its attempt to get out. More pointed and public, and much larger in size, is the dance taking place now between Chrysler Corporation, Fiat, the UAW, four lead lenders and, you guessed it, the federal government. The secured loans in question total almost $7 billion and the government wants J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citicorp and Morgan Stanley to exchange $5 billion of the loans for Chrysler stock. The banks know they would do better (for their shareholders) by selling off Chryslers assets. This is an example of why bankruptcy exists. The stakes are large and so is the business risk of the influence from the government. It will be interesting to see how things turn out. So, this new major owner does have a voice. If Congress wants certain lending volumes or terms, or they want certain compensation levels, it needs to be enacted into federal law. Short of having to pass a law, there is the implied threat of the big stick in the TARP agreement. The Purchase Agreement covers what the new owner wants now and may decide it wants in the future. This a form of strategic business risk that comes with accepting the capital infusion from this particular source.  

I've previously posted content around an overall risk-based approach to Red Flags compliance. I also want to keep current in mentioning the use of Knowledge Based Authentication (KBA) as an effective component in an Identity Theft Prevention Program.  I get this question often:  "Is KBA a fraud detection tool or a verification tool?"  Short answer:  "It's both."Beyond fraud detection and prevention, KBA implementation can provide your program real returns in a few key areas:Reconciliation of initially detected "Red Flag" conditionsKBA allows you to positively pass consumers who may have some level of initial authentication challenge or high-risk condition.  The reality of identity verification is that regardless of all the data assets potentially leveraged, there are still those cases in which a good consumer identity continues to pose challenges to basic verification checks.Cost reduction in referral / reconciliation processesKBA can replace more subjective decision making and process invocation, turning instead to objective question presentation and performance to drive overall decisioning.Customer experienceConsumers are more willing today than ever before to participate in a KBA session, and most would prefer this activity over provision of documentary evidence, for example.KBA, when used in combination with strong analytics and comprehensive authentication results, can be valued tool in your overall Red Flags Identity Theft Prevention program.

Behavioral scoring is one of the most important tools that allow collections management and account management groups to evaluate accounts in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Although behavioral models are developed in a similar manner as new applicant models, there are several key differences that make behavioral models a better choice for many account management applications and collections workflow systems:By using only internal master file data as opposed to external credit bureau data, for example, accounts can be regularly evaluated without incremental cost. The most common practices are to score accounts on a weekly or monthly basis, which allows for quick strategic responses to a customer’s change in behavior. Frequent evaluations can result in automated or manual actions such as the acceleration or deceleration of collections efforts, adjusting credit limits and changing terms and conditions.The performance definitions of behavioral scores are very specific to each strategy and task, and it is typically not advised to use models in applications for which they were not designed. For example, a new applicant model definition of “bad” may be a high probability of charge off during the initial term of a line of credit. For collections strategy, a more appropriate bad definition might be the likelihood of an account rolling to the next delinquency bucket, regardless of the age of the account. Behavioral models also have a much shorter outcome period of three to four months versus new applicant models that forecast over one to two years. Since behaviors with one creditor can typically be recognized more quickly than with all lending institutions associated with a particular debtor, behavioral models provide a unique and timely evaluation of the ongoing risk once the account is already on the books. 

As stated in an earlier posting, healthcare providers should ensure appropriate compliance with the Red Flags Rule.  There continues to be healthy debate as to what level of applicability the Red Flags Rule has in this market.  That said, the link below, to a recent article by the FTC, highlights some relevant points to think about as healthcare providers consider whether or not they are 'covered' and, if so, the appropriate measures to be taken in developing their Identity Theft Prevention Program.Of note, the article points out that "health care providers are creditors if they bill consumers after their services are completed. Health care providers that accept insurance are considered creditors if the consumer ultimately is responsible for the medical fees. However, simply accepting credit cards as a form of payment does not make you a creditor under the Red Flags Rule."  Based on this definition, it appears to some extent, that the majority of healthcare providers will be covered under the Red Flag Rule as creditors.I encourage you to have a look at this article if you are still on the fence: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/articles/art11.shtm

By: Prince Varma Good day all. My last blog revolved around practical approaches to effective client relationship management. It time to get back to a “risk” type conversation. I recently told my wife that if I hear the phrase “…in this economic environment …” uttered as a caveat one more time, I’m going to scream. I have truly come to anticipate the beginning or introduction to interviews and articles to lead in with this sentiment and it’s driving me nuts. In these economic times (you can tell I’m from the sales side, I cleverly changed the phrase), it is clearly not business as usual within most financial institutions. Conversations with CEOs and bank presidents over the past two months have usually followed the same theme, “I’ve got money to lend, but I just can’t find a decent deal” or “I’ve got applications up the wazoo, but the quality just isn’t there.” So, what is going on? The obvious answer is that we are looking at applications more closely and the credit side (risk management guys) is deliriously happy because everytime they make a recommendation about “reviewing the opportunity further” they also don’t hesitate to mention, “in this economic environment.” Really, what is the scoop and how do we adjust on the front line? Clearly, we know that deeper reviews and management of risk is being undertaken. The problem is that the established standards are no longer valid. Yes, the basics ratios still need to be run, but let’s face it, in this economic environment a company’s historical performance is no longer an effective indicator as to their future performance. The playing field is no longer consistent. The past two to three years of financials are based on circumstances that no longer apply. This means that the analysts are having a difficult time establishing effective benchmarks from which to apply credit policy – and we know that those guys are the paragons of adaptability. We are being asked to evaluate risk in an uncertain circumstance. We are looking at projected revenues and earnings and examining receivables. We are also comparing this business to others in the industry, determining which other market segments have a direct (and indirect) impact on the performance of this one, reviewing business plans and evaluating management depth and experience. And, at the end of the day, either saying no, saying yes but not so much or holding our breath and hoping that divine intervention shows us the way. Does any of this should sound familiar to you? It should. We see these type of deals all of the time and we call them the start-ups. Ok, so what am I recommending? Quite simply, that we take a step back from our typical approach to the established business and engage with them the way we would a start-up. When an opportunity or request presents itself, restrain the urge to go down the garden path. Slow down! No... stop! Take a deep breath, put on your “economic development hat ” and approach the deal the way you would if it were a start-up (and I don’t mean running away at top speed in the opposite direction screaming). You should: look for or help them construct a short term (next four to six month) tactical action/priority plan; help them or review their 12-month business plan; o NOTE: If the business hasn’t realized that they need a short-term survival plan and a mid-term business plan… run! Run far and run fast! examine their market and have them explain why they will make it versus the competition; dig into their management expertise (think AIG); have them explain how their tactical and 12-month business plan will keep the doors open and the lights on (since its coming into summer we’ll cut them some slack on the heat); and finally review and revise their projections. If at the end of this, you still feel that the deal has legs, it probably does, and you’ve done a pretty thorough job building the business case for the credit side. Or, you could just lament that there really isn’t much out there in this economic environment.

By: Prince Varma Part 2 Two additional tactics that you should incorporate into your relationship management penetration strategy include: Conducting relationship reviews in addition to loan reviews; and Identifying and proactively monitoring changes in client behavior. Relationship reviews Relationship reviews are a comprehensive and thorough examination of the client’s business and should be the foundation for your relationship management process. They seek to provide both the client and the relationship manager with a roadmap for the upcoming 14- to 16-month period by identifying specific goals and concerns, as well as constructing a snapshot of the client today. The purpose of a relationship review is to understand the broader direction.  Bluntly put, an annual loan review is not a penetration activity. Its primary focus is to verify the ongoing credit worthiness of an existing deal in the books. More details will come about this topic in a future blog. Monitoring changes in behavior Monitoring changes in client behavior through the use of “activity thresholding” is quickly becoming a mainstay in the financial industry. The idea isn’t new; however, the application of the concept to penetration is. Instead of having changes in credit score trigger an alert related to risk management and mitigation, we would instead look at thresholds related to line usage, number of deposit transactions, changes in average deposit amount and credit card transactions. These kinds of client behaviors and activities provide insight into what is occurring within a clients business and as such, allow us to provide recommendations for products and services that are meaningful and appropriate.

This post is a feature from my colleague and guest blogger, Barry Timm, Senior Process Architect in Advisory Services at Baker Hill, a part of Experian. 2008 has proven to be an unbelievably challenging year for the economy as a whole, let alone the financial industry.  Never before have we experienced the type and degree of turmoil that we did in 2008, even since the “Great Depression”. These economic challenges have been quick, severe and widespread; and, from large corporations to the individual consumer, all have been impacted to some degree.  The stock market is down, unemployment up, consumer confidence down, delinquencies up ….not exactly a pleasant roller coaster ride. And, there is no longer any projecting as to when the “bubble” is going to burst.  It happened.   Decreased real estate values have occurred not only in high impact geographic regions but throughout the country.  While home equity products have traditionally been the “golden child” of consumer loan product offerings, recent economic changes have caused a shift in that perspective.  As a result, tightened underwriting standards have limited the availability of the product as a whole.  In some markets the product offering has even been temporarily halted. We frequently hear the terminology “bailout” being used in the news.  While we all have expectations as it relates to the bailout approach, I thought I would “Google” the word “bailout” to see what would magically appear.  Interestingly enough, the first listing was titled “Walk away from your home”, with a link to the home page for a mortgage default legal team.  This is not exactly what I was expecting to find, but is definitely reflective of the times. And, according to the FDIC, there have been 25 failed financial instituions in the year 2008.  This single year number equates to the total number of failed financial institutions between the prior periods 2001 through 2007. Okay … enough doom and gloom.  In spite of all that has occurred within the economy, some financial institutions continue to maintain a strong credit quality position in their consumer portfolios and have maintained profitability throughout all of the market volatility. What are the strong survivors doing that differentiates themselves from the others? 1. They understand their portfolio.   Advisory Services frequently assists clients with various types of portfolio management analysis and often presents those findings to senior management.  We often hear that management is surprised by the results of that analysis. The point is that high-level management reporting is not enough these days. Additional detail and depth are necessary. More specifically, as opposed to evaluating payment performance at the portfolio level, it is important to consider the following: Do you know your delinquency numbers at the product level? How do delinquencies compare to your product approval rates? Do you routinely compare approval/decline rates and delinquencies to scorecard results and/or credit bureau scores? Do you know where pricing exceptions are being made and are you receiving sufficient return for the level of risk? 2. A focused strategy is in place. It is important to re-emphasize the specific, strategic direction and focus of your defined market.  Now is not the time to be “pushing the envelope” and extending into untested waters.  There is something to be said about focusing on your strengths, staying within your defined footprint and meeting the needs of your core, proven line of business while following sound financial risk management. 3. The underwriting process is under control. This does not automatically mean that a “tightening” of underwriting standards is necessary.  It does mean, however, that stronger attention to detail is warranted.  It is important that underwriting criteria is reviewed and that you are sure that defined underwriting practices are consistently applied.  As noted in item number one above, this may require digging a little deeper and reviewing current and past decisioned loans (preferably with a critical eye of an independent third party).  Assessing the underwriting process becomes increasing complex and more critical with a decentralized underwriting approach. Focus on the positive Now that 2008 is behind us, let’s continue to focus on the positives to come in 2009.  Reflect on the past, but strive to center your attention on ongoing portfolio monitoring, financial risk management assessments and improvements for the future.  

If you have detected a Red Flag in connection with a credit application, are you prohibited from opening the account when following the Red Flag guidelines?First, you must assess whether the Red Flag evidences a risk of identity theft and your response must be commensurate with the degree of risk that is posed. You generally are not prohibited from opening the account, unless the only appropriate response in light of the degree of risk posed by the Red Flag would be not to open the account. In some instances, for example, you may be able to contact the applicant directly to verify that the application is legitimate. 

Part fourImproved change management process is one of the items at the very top of many collections professional’s wish list. In most legacy collections systems, the change management process is slow, expensive and labor intensive. It is not uncommon for an organization to take three, six or even 12 months to implement a system change, depending on the complexity of the request. Additionally, the expenses for a vendor or internal IT department to code, test and deploy the change can cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. Aside from the cost and timelines, the impact to the business can be suffocating, particularly when the business users are unable to keep up with rapidly changing requirements.Change controlOne of the most exciting and innovative features of next generation collection management software systems is the ability to make changes quickly and efficiently, without the need for hard coding or extensive testing. Additionally, change control responsibilities can be granted to business users, who can then be empowered to make system changes, without the support of the software vendors or their internal IT departments. If desired, the change controls can be segmented or shared to ensure (via secure access rights) that only qualified individuals are empowered to make changes and that their skill and knowledge align with the assigned access. Regardless of where the control lies, the entire organization benefits from a change management process that is fast, efficient and easy to manage.The types of system changes that benefit from modern technology include just about any imaginable task. Simple screen or scripting changes fall on one side of the complexity spectrum, while modifications to database layouts lean towards the other end. Linking to other complimentary systems and data sources is also quicker and easier which enables hooks to be implemented in days and weeks rather than months or years.Financial benefitThe financial benefit metric of improved change management is relatively straight forward, although it is not always possible to accurately gauge the benefit ahead of the change event itself. For example, the financial value can be calculated as the benefit of the change itself (considering only the time it is in production) ahead of when it would have been deployed in a legacy environment. Additionally, we must factor the labor and fees that would have been spent to implement the change in the legacy system, less what was actually spent. For example, let’s assume a given change adds $50,000 in monthly benefits. Let’s also assume that we can implement and test the change in a next generation system in one week, while the same change could take six months in a legacy system. The value of the faster change is then $300,000 and we have saved a significant amount of money in labor and fees above and beyond that. One of the key benefits of next generation systems is that these collections efficiency changes can be made in days or weeks rather than months or years. Considering that in a year an organization with modern technology could design and implement many beneficial changes rather than just a handful, the return on investment increases exponentially with additional change management activity.My next blog will be the last in this “next generation collections systems” series and brings together the financial benefits highlighted in my previous blogs in the form of an ROI case study. Common objections and relevant considerations will also be discussed.Stay tuned! 

By: Prince Varma Hello. My name is Prince Varma and I’ve spent the better part of the last 16 years helping financial institutions (FI) successfully improve their in business development, portfolio growth and client relationship management practices. So, since the focus of this blog is to speak to readers about risk management, many of you are probably wondering what a “sales and business development” guy is doing writing a piece related to mitigating and managing risk? Great question! The simple fact is that the traditional or prevailing sentiment or definition related to risk management – mitigating credit risk -- is incomplete. A more accurate and comprehensive approach would be to recognize, acknowledge and address that “risk” cuts across the entire client relationship spectrum of: client penetration/growth; client retention; and client credit risk mitigation. How do penetration and retention count as “risk factors”? (this is where the sales guy stuff comes in) From a penetration perspective, the failure to recognize potential opportunities either within the existing client base or in the operating market, introduces revenue growth risk (meaning we aren’t keeping our eye on the top line). Ultimately it impacts the FI’s ability to add assets (either deposits or loans) and also has a direct affect on efficiency and deposit to loan ratios. From a retention perspective, the risk is even more obvious. Our most valued clients are the ones that we must continuously engage in a proactive manner. Let’s face it. In even the smallest markets, there are no less than four to six other institutions waiting to jump on your client in the event that you grow complacent. There is a huge difference between selection and satisfaction. And, if we aren’t focused on keeping a client after securing them, our net portfolio growth targets will be impossible to achieve. Considering the current market environment, now more than ever, effectively managing these three elements of “risk/exposure to the FI” is crucial to an institutions success both practically and pragmatically. Everyone internally at the bank is focused on the “credit risk mitigation” piece. The conversations that are occurring outside of the bank’s walls however are focused on the “L” word or liquidity and getting credit flowing again. How many times have we read or more frankly been beaten with this comment from business owners “…there’s no one making loans anymore…” or “…its impossible to get credit…?” That should be read as … penetration and retention Striking a balance between effective and appropriate credit risk exposure and deepening or growing the portfolio has been a challenge facing those of us in the front office for as long as I can remember. The “sales revolution” is effectively over. We’ve learned the critical lesson that we need to evolve beyond being strictly a credit officer (you did learn that right??!!). And, you didn’t/shouldn’t become a “banking products generalist” with no analytical depth. Knowing all this, it is important that we return to the guiding principles of effective lending which include: - evaluating the scope of the opportunity; - isolating the risk and identifying a reasonable and realistic recovery/mitigation remedy; - determining what other alternatives the borrower might be considering; and - being willing to let the “bad deals” walk. In subsequent blogs, I’ll provide you with specific tactics aimed at optimizing penetration and retention efforts and implementing effective and practical client management strategies. After all what would you expect from a business development guy…

When you begin thinking about financial risk management, you must begin with a vision for your loan portfolio and the similarity of a loan portfolio to that of an investment portfolio.  Now that you have that vision in place, we can focus on the overall strategy to achieve that vision. A valuable first step in loan portfolio monitoring is to establish a targeted value by a certain time (say, our targeted retirement age).  Similarly, it’s important that we establish our vision for the loan portfolio regarding overall diversification, return and the management of risk levels. The next step is to create a strategy to achieve the targeted state.  By focusing on the gaps between our current state and the vision state we have created, we can develop an action plan for achieving the future/vision state.  I am going to introduce some rather unique ideas here. Consider which of your portfolio segments are overweight?  One that comes to mind would be the commercial real estate portfolio.  The binge that has taken place over the past five plus years has resulted in an unhealthy concentration of loans in the commercial real estate segment.  In this one area alone, we will face the greatest challenge of right-sizing our portfolio mix and achieving the appropriate risk model per our vision. We have to assess our overall credit risk in the portfolios next.  For small business and consumer portfolios, this is relatively easy using the various credit scores that are available to assess the current risk.  For the larger commercial and industrial portfolios and the commercial real estate portfolios, we must employ some more manual processes to assess risk.  Unfortunately, we have to perform appropriate risk assessments (current up-to-date risk assessments) in order to move on to the next stage of this overall process (which is to execute on the strategy). Once we have the dollar amounts of either growth or divestiture in various portfolio segments, we can employ the risk assessment to determine the appropriate execution of either growth or divestiture.

By: Tom Hannagan   Part 5 This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are some findings for the two largest groups, covering 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk. Peer Group 2 (PG2) consists of 305 reporting banks between $1 billion and $3 billion in assets. PG2’s Net Interest Income was 5.75 percent of average total assets for the year. This is also down, as expected, from 6.73 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense also decreased from 3.07 percent in 2007 to 2.31 percent for 2008.  Net Interest Margin, also declined from 3.66 percent in 2007 to 3.42 percent in 2008, or a loss of 24 basis points. These margins are 31 bps or 10 percent higher than found in Peer Group 1 (PG1), but the drop of .24 percent was much larger than the .05 percent decline in PG1. As with all banks, Net Interest Margins have shown a steady chronic decline, but the drops for PG2 have been coming in larger chunks the last two years -- -24 basis points last year after dropping 16 points from 2006 to 2007. Behind the drop in margins, we find loans yields of 6.53 percent for 2008, which is down from 7.82 percent in 2007. This is a decline of 129 basis points or 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.70 percent in 2007 to 2.75 percent in 2008. This 95 basis point decline represents a 26 percent lower cost of interest-bearing deposits. Again, with a steeper decline in interest costs, you would think that margins should have improved somewhat. It wasn’t meant to be. We see the same two culprits as we did in PG1. Total deposit balances declined from 78 percent of average assets to 77 percent which means again, that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits continued an already steady decline from 5.58 percent of average assets in 2007 to 5.03 percent. This, of course, resulted in fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size and a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits. Check my next blog for more on an analysis of Peer Group 2’s fee income, operating expenses and their use of risk-based pricing.  

By: Tom Hannagan Part 4 Let’s dig a bit deeper into why Peer Group 1’s margins didn’t improve. We see two possible reasons: Total deposit balances declined from 72 percent of average assets to 70 percent. This means that a larger amount had to be borrowed to fund their assets. Secondly, non-interest bearing demand deposits declined from 4.85 percent of average assets to 4.24 percent. So, fewer deposit balances relative to total asset size, along with a lower proportion of interest-cost-free deposits, appear to have made the difference. Fee income Non-interest income, again as a percent of average total assets, was down to 1.12 percent from 1.23 percent in 2007. This was a decline of 9 percent. For Peer Group 1 (PG1), fees have also been steadily declining relative to asset size, down from 1.49 percent of assets in 2005. A lot of fee income is deposit based and largely based on non-interest bearing deposits. So, the declining interest-free balances, as a percent of total assets, are a source of pressure on fee income and have a negative impact on net interest margins. Operating expenses Operating expenses constituted more bad news as they increased from 2.63 percent to 2.77 percent of average assets. Most of the large scale cost-cutting didn’t get started early enough to favorably impact this number for last year. Historically, this metric has moved down, irregularly, as the size of the largest banks has grown. This number stood at 2.54 percent in 2006, for instance. We saw increase in both 2007 and again in 2008. As a result of the decline in margins and the larger percentage decline in fee income, while operating costs increased, the Peer Group 1 efficiency ratio lost ground from 57.71 percent in 2007 up to 63.70 percent in 2008. This 10 percent increase is a move to the bad. It means every dollar in gross revenue [net interest income + fee income] cost them almost 64 cents in administrative expenses in 2008. This metric averaged 55 cents in 2005/2006. The total impact of changes in margin performance, fee income, operating expenses and the 2008 increase in provision expense of 87 basis points, we arrive at a total decline in pre-tax operating income of 1.23 percent on total assets. That is a total decline of 80 percent from the pre-tax performance in 2007 of 1.53 percent pre-tax ROA to the 2008 result for the group of only .30 percent pre-tax ROA. It would appear that banks have not been utilizing pricing enough credit risk into their loan rates.  This would be further confirmed if you compared bank loan rates to the historic risk spreads and absolute rates that the market currently has priced into both investment grade and below-investment-grade corporate bonds. These spreads have decreased some very recently, but it is predicted that more credit risk is present than bank lending rates would indicate.

Back during World War I, the concept of “triage” was first introduced to the battlefield.  Faced with massive casualties and limited medical resources, a system was developed to identify and select those who most needed treatment and who would best respond to treatment.  Some casualties were tagged as terminal and received no aid; others with minimal injuries were also passed over.  Instead, medical staff focused their attentions on those who required their services in order to be saved.  These were the ones who needed and would respond to appropriate treatment. Our clients realize that the collections battlefield of today requires a similar approach.  They have limited resources to face this mounting wave of delinquencies and charge offs.  They also realize that they can’t throw bodies at this problem. They need to work smarter and use data and decisioning more effectively to help them survive this battle.Some accounts will never “cure” no matter what you do.  Others will self-cure with minimal or no active effort. Taking the right actions on the right accounts, with the right resources, at the right time is best accomplished with advanced segmentation that employs behavioral scoring, bureau-based scores and other relevant account data. The actual data and scores that should be used depend on the situation and account status, and there is no one-size-fits-all approach.Future related articles will dive deeper into the various segmentation approach options and explain how advanced decisioning provides additional benefit over the score-only methods. 

By: Tom Hannagan Part 3 I believe it is quite important to compare your bank or your investment plans in a financial institution to the results of peer group averages. Not all banks are the same, believe it or not. In this column, we use the averages. Again, look for the differences in your target institution. About half of them beat certain performance numbers, while the other half are naturally worse. It can tell a useful story. This continues the updated review of results from the Uniform Bank Performance Reports (UBPR), courtesy of the FDIC, for 2008. The UBPR is based on the quarterly required Call Reports submitted by insured banks. The FDIC compiles peer averages for various bank size groupings. Here are the findings for the two largest groups that cover 494 reporting banks. I wanted to see how the various profit performance components compare to the costs of credit risk discussed in my previous post. It is even more apparent than it was in early 2008 that banks still have a ways to go to be fully pricing loans for both expected and unexpected risk. Peer Group 1 (PG1) is made up of the largest 189 reporting banks or those with over $3 billion in average total assets for 2008. Interest income was 5.25 percent of average total assets for the period. This is down, as we might expect, based on last year’s decline in the general level of interest rates from 6.16 percent in 2007. Net Interest Expense was also down from 2.98 percent in 2007 to 2.06 percent average for the year. Net Interest Margin, the difference between the two metrics, was down from 3.16 percent in 2007 to 3.11 percent as a percentage of total assets. It should be noted that Net Interest Margins have been in a steady, chronic decline for at least 10 years, with a torturous regular drop of 2 to 5 basis points per annum in recent years. Last year’s drop of five basis points is in line with that progression and it does add to continuing difficulty in generating bottom-line profits. To find out a bit more about why margins dropped, especially in light of the steady increase in lending over the same past decade, we looked first at loan pricing yields. For PG1 these averaged 6.12 percent for 2008, down (again, expectedly) from 7.32 percent in 2007. This is a drop of 120 basis points or a decline of 16 percent. Meanwhile, rates paid on interest-earning deposits dropped from 3.41 percent in 2007 to 2.39 percent in 2008. This 102 basis point decline represents a 30 percent lower interest expense on interest-bearing deposits. Based only on these two metrics, it seems like margins should have improved and not declined for these banks. Check my next blog for more on the reasons for Peer Group 1’s drop in margins and an analysis of the fee income and operating expenses for these institutions.