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By:Wendy Greenawalt In my last few blogs, I have discussed how optimizing decisions can be leveraged across an organization while considering the impact those decisions have to organizational profits, costs or other business metrics. In this entry, I would like to discuss how this strategy can be used in optimizing decisions at the point of acquisition, while minimizing costs. Determining the right account terms at inception is increasingly important due to recent regulatory legislation such as the Credit Card Act. These regulations have established guidelines specific to consumer age, verification of income, teaser rates and interest rate increases. Complying with these regulations will require changes to existing processes and creation of new toolsets to ensure organizations adhere to the guidelines. These new regulations will not only increase the costs associated with obtaining new customers, but also the long term revenue and value as changes in account terms will have to be carefully considered. The cost of on-boarding and servicing individual accounts continues to escalate, and internal resources remain flat. Due to this, organizations of all sizes are looking for ways to improve efficiency and decisions while minimizing costs. Optimization is an ideal solution to this problem. Optimized strategy trees can be easily implemented into current processes and ensure lending decisions adhere to organizational revenue, growth or cost objectives as well as regulatory requirements.  Optimized strategy trees enable organizations to create executable strategies that provide on-going decisions based upon optimization conducted at a consumer level. Optimized strategy trees outperform manually created trees as they are created utilizing sophisticated mathematical analysis and ensure organizational objectives are adhered to. In addition, an organization can quantify the expected ROI of a given strategy and provide validation in strategies – before implementation. This type of data is not available without the use of a sophisticated optimization software application.  By implementing optimized strategy trees, organizations can minimize the volume of accounts that must be manually reviewed, which results in lower resource costs. In addition, account terms are determined based on organizational priorities leading to increased revenue, retention and profitability.

By: Wendy Greenawalt Marketing is typically one of the largest expenses for an organization while also being a priority to reach short and long-term growth objectives. With the current economic environment, continuing to be unpredictable many organizations have reduced budgets and focused on more risk and recovery activities. However, in the coming year we expect to see improvements and organizations renew their focus to portfolio growth. We expect that campaign budgets will continue to be much lower than what was allocated before the mortgage meltdown but organizations are still looking for gains in efficiency and response to meet business objectives. Creation of optimized marketing strategies is quick and easy when leveraging optimization technology enabling your internal resources to focus on more strategic issues. Whether your objective is to increase organizational or customer level profit, growth in specific product lines or maximizing internal resources optimization can easily identify the right solution while adhering to key business objectives. The advanced software now available enables an organization to compare multiple campaign options simultaneously while analyzing the impact of modifications to revenue, response or other business metrics. Specifically, very detailed product offer information, contact channels, timing, and letter costs from multiple vendors and consumer preferences can all be incorporated into an optimization solution. Once defined the complex mathematical algorithm factors every combination of all variables, which could range in the thousands, are considered at the consumer level to determine the optimal treatment to maximize organizational goals and constraints. In addition, by incorporating optimized decisions into marketing strategies marketers can execute campaigns in a much shorter timeframe allowing an organization to capitalize on changing market conditions and consumer behaviors. To illustrate the benefit of optimization an Experian bankcard client was able to reduced analytical time to launch programs from 7 days to 90 minutes while improving net present value. In my next blog, we will discuss how organizations can cut costs when acquiring new accounts.  

By: Tom Hannagan While waiting on the compilation of fourth quarter banking industry results, I thought it might be interesting to relate the commercial real estate (CRE) risk management position facing commercial banks from the third quarter. CRE risk is an important consideration in enterprise risk management and for loan pricing and profitability. The slowdown in the global economy has affected CRE credit risk because of increased vacancy rates, halted development projects, and the loss of value affecting commercial properties. As CRE loans come up for renewal, many will find that there have equity deficits and that they are facing tightened credit standards. If a commercial property loan started life at 80 percent loan to value, and the property value has dropped 25 percent, the renewed loan balance will be down at least 25 percent, requiring a substantial net payoff from the borrower. This net cash payoff requirement would be tough to accomplish in good times and all-but-impossible for many borrowers in this economy. After all, the main reason for the decline in property value to begin with is its reduced cash flow performance. Following the third quarter numbers, total U.S. commercial real estate is generally estimated at $3.4 to $3.5 trillion. Commercial banks owned just over half of that debt, or about $1.8 trillion according to Federal Reserve and FDIC sources. The (possibly only) good news with that total is that commercial banks owned a relatively small share of the commercial-mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) slice of CRE exposure. CMBS assets were 21 percent of total CRE credit or $714 billion, but banks owned a total of $54 billion, which represented only 3 percent of total bank CRE assets. Unfortunately, the opposite is true for construction lending. U.S. banks, in total, had $486 to $534 billion (depending on the source) in construction and land loans, representing 27 percent to 30 percent of banks’ total CRE holdings. The true credit risk management picture is much more revealing if we cut the numbers by bank size. According to Deutsche Bank research, the largest 97 banks (those with over $10 billion in total assets) had $14.8 trillion in total assets and $1.0 trillion of the banking industry’s CRE credits.  This amounts to about 7 percent of the total assets for this group of larger banks. The 7,500 community banks, with aggregate assets of $2 trillion, had about $786 billion in CRE lending. This amounts to about 28 percent of total assets. That is roughly four times the level of exposure found in the larger banks. The 7 percent level of credit risk average exposure at the large bank group is less than their average level of equity or risk-based capital. For the banks under the $10 billion level, the 28 percent level of CRE exposure is almost three times their average equity position. The riskiest portion of CRE lending is clearly the construction and land development loans. The subtotals in this area confirm where the cumulative risk lies. Again, according to Deutsche Bank research, the largest 97 banks had $299 billion of the banking industry’s $534 billion in construction loans. Although this is 56 percent of total bank construction lending, it amounts to only 2 percent of this group’s total assets.  The 7,500 community banks had aggregate construction loans of $235 billion. This amounts to about 8.5 percent of total assets. That is a bit over four times the level of exposure found in the larger banks. The 2 percent level of construction credit risk exposure at the large bank group is one-fourth of their average level of common equity. At banks under the $10 billion level, the 8.5 percent level of CRE exposure, compared to total assets, is about the same as their average equity position. According to Moody’s, bank have already taken about $90 billion in net loan losses in CRE assets through the third quarter of 2009. That means the industry has perhaps another $150 billion in write-offs coming. This would total $240 billion in CRE credit losses for the banking industry due to this economic downturn. That would equate to 13.3 percent of the banking industry’s share of total CRE credit. With the decline in commercial property values ranging from 10 percent to 40 percent, a 13 percent loss is certainly not a worst case scenario. Banks have ramped up their loss reserves, and although the numbers aren’t out yet, we know many banks have used the fourth quarter 2009 to further bolster their allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL). The larger the ALLL, the safer the risk-based equity account. Risk managers are aware of all of this and banks are very actively developing their strategies to handle the refunding requirements and, at the same time, be in a position to explain to regulators and external auditor how they are protecting shareholders. But the numbers are very daunting and not every bank will have enough net cash flow and risk equity to cover the inevitable losses.  

By: Amanda Roth Last week, we discussed how pricing with competition is important to ensure sound decision practices are being implemented in the domains of loan pricing and profitability.  The extreme of pricing too high for the market can obviously be detrimental to your organization.  The other extreme can be just as dangerous. Pricing for your profitability, regardless of what the competition is charging in your area, has a few potential issues associated with it regarding management of risk.  For example, the statistics state you can charge 5 percent in your “A” tier and still be profitable, but the competition is charging 7.5 percent for the same tier.  You may be thinking that by offering 5 percent you will attract the “best of the best” to your organization.  However, what your statistics may not be showing you is the risk outside of your applicant base.  If you significantly change the customers you are bringing in, does your risk increase as well, ultimately increasing the cost associated with each loan?   Increased costs will reduce or even eliminate the profitability you had expected. A second potential issue is setting the expectation within the marketplace.  It is often understood with the consumers that when changes occur to the interest rate at the federal level, there will be changes at their local financial institution.  These changes are often very small.  By undercutting your competition by such an extreme amount, your customers may question any attempts to raise rates more than 50bp, if you do experience increased costs as a result of the earlier situation or any other factors.  A safer strategy would be to charge between 6.5 percent and 7 percent, which allows you to obtain some of the best customers, ensure stability within the market, and take advantage of additional profitability while it is available.  This is definitely a winning strategy for all -- and an important consideration as you develop your portfolio risk management objectives.    

By: Amanda Roth Doesn’t that sound strange: Pricing WITH competition?  We are familiar with the sayings of pricing for competition and pricing to be competitive, but did you ever think you would need to price with competition?  When developing a risk-based pricing program, it is important to make sure you do not price against the competition in any extreme.  Some clients decide they want to price lower than the competition regardless of how it impacts their profitability.  However, others price only for profitability without any respect to their competition.  As we discussed last week, risk-based pricing is 80 percent statistics, but 20 percent art -- and competition is part of the artistic portion. Once you complete your profitability analysis (refer to 12/28/2009 posting), you will often need to massage the final interest rate to be applied to loan applications.  If the results of the analysis are that your interest rate needs to be 8.0 percent in your “A” tier to guarantee profitability, but your competition is only charging 6.0 percent, there could be a problem if you go to market with that pricing strategy.  You will probably experience most of your application volume coming to an end, especially those customers with low risk that can obtain the best rates of a lender.  Creativity is the approach you must take to become more competitive while still maintaining profitability.  It may be an approach of offering the 6.0 percent rate to the best 10 percent of your applicant base only, while charging slightly higher rates in your “D” and “E” tiers. Another option may be that you need to look internally at processing efficiencies to determine if there is a way to decrease the overall cost associated with the decision process.  Are there decision strategies in place that are creating a manual decision when more could be automated?  Pricing higher than the market rate can be detrimental to any organization, therefore it is imperative to apply an artistic approach while maintaining the integrity of the statistical analysis. Join us next week to continue this topic of pricing with competition which is, again, an important consideration when developing a risk-based pricing program.  

By: Tom Hannagan Apparently my last post on the role of risk management in the pricing of deposit services hit some nerve ends. That’s good. The industry needs its “nerve ends” tweaked after the dearth of effective risk management that contributed to the financial malaise of the last couple of years. Banks, or any business, can prosper by simply following their competitors’ marketing strategies and meeting or slightly undercutting their prices. The actions of competitors are an important piece of intelligence to consider, but not necessarily optimal for your bank to copy. One question is regarding the “how-to” behind risk-based pricing (RBP) of deposits. The answer has four parts. Let’s see. First, because of the importance and size of the deposit business (yes, it’s a line of business) as a funding source, one needs to isolate the interest rate risk. This is done by transfer pricing, or in a sense, crediting the deposit balances for their marginal value as an offset to borrowing funds. This transfer price has nothing to do with the earnings credit rate used in account analysis – that is a merchandising issue used to generate fee income. Fees, resulting from account analysis, when not waived, affect the profitability of deposit services, but are not a risk element. Two things are critical to the transfer of funding credit: 1) the assumptions regarding the duration, or reliability of the deposit balances and 2) the rate curve used to match the duration. Different types of deposit behave differently based on changes in rates paid. Checking account deposit funds tend to be very loyal or “sticky” - they don’t move around a lot (or easily) because of rate paid, if any. At the other extreme, time deposits tend to be very rate-sensitive and can move (in or out) for small incremental gains. Savings, money market and NOW accounts are in-between. Since deposits are an offset (ultimately) to marginal borrowing, just as loans might (ultimately) require marginal borrowing, we recommend using the same rate curve for both asset and liability transfer pricing. The money is the same thing on both sides of the balance sheet and the rate curve used to fund a loan or credit a deposit should be the same. We believe this will help, greatly, to isolate IRR. It is also seems more fair when explaining the concept to line management. Secondly, although there is essentially no credit risk associated with deposits, there is operational risk. Deposit make up most of the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore the lion’s share of institutional funding. Deposits are also a major source of operational expense. The mitigated operational risks such as physical security, backup processing arrangements, various kinds of insurance and catastrophe plans, are normal expenses of doing business and included in a bank’s financial statements. The costs need to be broken down by deposit category to get a picture of the risk-adjusted operating expenses. The third major consideration for analyzing risk-adjusted deposit profitability is its revenue contribution. Deposit-related fee income can be a very significant number and needs to be allocated to particular deposit category that generates this income. This is an important aspect of the return, along with the risk-adjusted funding value of the balances. It will vary substantially for various deposit types. Time deposits have essentially zero fee income, whereas checking accounts can produce significant revenues. The fourth major consideration is capital. There are unexpected losses associated with deposits that must be covered by risk-based capital – or equity. The unexpected losses include: unmitigated operational risks, any error in transfer pricing the market risk, and business or strategic risk. Although the unexpected losses associated with deposit products are substantially less than found in the lending products, they needs to be taken into account to have a fully risk-adjusted view. It is also necessary to be able to compare the risk-adjusted profit and profitability of such diverse services as found within banking. Enterprise risk management needs to consider all of the lines of business, and all of the products of the organization, on a risk-adjusted performance basis. Otherwise it is impossible to decide on the allocation of resources, including precious capital. Without this risk management view of deposits (just as with loans) it is impossible to price the services in a completely knowledgeable fashion. Good entity governance, asset and liability posturing, and competent line of business management, all require more and better risk-based profit considerations to be an important part of the intelligence used to optimally price deposits.      

By: Amanda Roth The reality of risk-based pricing is that there is not one “end all be all” way of determining what pricing should be applied to your applicants.  The truth is that statistics will only get you so far.  It may get you 80 percent of the final answer, but to whom is 80 percent acceptable?  The other 20 percent must also be addressed. I am specifically referring to those factors that are outside of your control.  For example, does your competition’s pricing impact your ability to price loans?  Have you thought about how loyal customer discounts or incentives may contribute to the success or demise of your program?  Do you have a sensitive population that may have a significant reaction to any risk-base pricing changes?  These questions must be addressed for sound pricing and risk management. Over the next few weeks, we will look at each of these questions in more detail along with tips on how to apply them in your organization.  As the new year is often a time of reflection and change, I would encourage you to let me know what experiences you may be having in your own programs.  I would love to include your thoughts and ideas in this blog.  

By: Tom Hannagan This blog has often discussed many aspects of risk-adjusted pricing for loans. Loans, with their inherent credit risk, certainly deserve a lot of attention when it comes to risk management in banking. But, that doesn’t mean you should ignore the risk management implications found in the other product lines. Enterprise risk management needs to consider all of the lines of business, and all of the products of the organization. This would include the deposit services arena. Deposits make up roughly 65 percent to 75 percent of the liability side of the balance sheet for most financial institutions, representing the lion’s share of their funding source. This is a major source of operational expense and also represents most of the bank’s interest expense. The deposit activity has operational risk, and this large funding source plays a huge role in market risk – including both interest rate risk and liquidity risk. It stands to reason that such risks are considered when pricing deposit services. Unfortunately it is not always the case. Okay, to be honest, it’s too rarely the case. This raises serious entity governance questions. How can such a large operational undertaking, not withstanding the criticality of the funding implications, not be subjected to risk-based pricing considerations? We have seen warnings already that the current low interest rate environment will not last forever. When the economy improves and rates head upwards, banks need to understand the bottom line profit implications. Deposit rate sensitivity across the various deposit types is a huge portion of the impact on net interest income. Risk-based pricing of these services should be considered before committing to provide them. Even without the credit risk implications found on the loan side of the balance sheet, there is still plenty of operational and market risk impact that needs to be taken into account from the liability side. When risk management is not considered and mitigated as part of the day-to-day management of the deposit line of business, the bank is leaving these risks completely to chance. This unmitigated risk increases the portion of overall risk that is then considered to be “unexpected” in nature and thereby increases the equity capital required to support the bank.

By: Amanda Roth The final level of validation for your risk-based pricing program is to validate for profitability.  Not only will this analysis build on the two previous analyses, but it will factor in the cost of making a loan based on the risk associated with that applicant.  Many organizations do not complete this crucial step.  Therefore, they may have the applicants grouped together correctly, but still find themselves unprofitable. The premise of risk-based pricing is that we are pricing to cover the cost associated with an applicant.  If an applicant has a higher probability of delinquency, we can assume there will be additional collection costs, reporting costs, and servicing costs associated with keeping this applicant in good standing.  We must understand what these cost may be, though, before we can price accordingly.  Information of this type can be difficult to determine based on the resources available to your organization.  If you aren’t able to determine the exact amount of time and costs associated with the different loans at different risk levels, there are industry best practices that can be applied. Of primary importance is to factor in the cost to originate, service and terminate a loan based on varying risk levels.  This is the only true way to validate that your pricing program is working to provide profitability to your loan portfolio.  

By: Amanda Roth To refine your risk-based pricing another level, it is important to analyze where your tiers are set and determine if they are set appropriately.  (We find many of the regulators / examiners are looking for this next level of analysis.) This analysis begins with the results of the scoring model validation.  Not only will the distributions from that analysis determine if the score can predict between good and delinquent accounts, but it will also highlight which score ranges have similar delinquency rates, allowing you to group your tiers together appropriately.  After all, you do not want to have applicants with a 1 percent chance of delinquency priced the same as someone with an 8 percent chance of delinquency.  By reviewing the interval delinquency rates as well as the odds ratios, you should be able to determine where a significant enough difference occurs to warrant different pricing. You will increase the opportunity for portfolio profitability through this analysis, as you are reducing the likelihood that higher risk applicants are receiving lower pricing.  As expected, the overall risk management of the portfolio will increase when a proper risk-based pricing program is developed. In my next post we will look the final level of validation which does provide insight into pricing for profitability.  

By: Amanda Roth As discussed earlier, the validation of a risk based-pricing program can mean several different things. Let’s break these options down. The first option is to complete a validation of the scoring model being used to set the pricing for your program. This is the most basic validation of the program, and does not guarantee any insight on loan profitability expectations. A validation of this nature will help you to determine if the score being used is actually helping to determine the risk level of an applicant. This analysis is completed by using a snapshot of new booked loans received during a period of time usually 18–24 months prior to the current period. It is extremely important to view only the new booked loans taken during the time period and the score they received at the time of application. By maintaining this specific population only, you will ensure the analysis is truly indicative of the predictive nature of your score at the time you make the decision and apply the recommended risk-base pricing. By analyzing the distribution of good accounts vs. the delinquent accounts, you can determine if the score being used is truly able to separate these groups. Without acceptable separation, it would be difficult to make any decisions based on the score models, especially risk-based pricing. Although beneficial in determining whether you are using the appropriate scoring models for pricing, this analysis does not provide insight into whether your risk-based pricing program is set up correctly or not. Please join me next time to take a look at another option for this analysis.

By: Roger Ahern It’s been proven in practice many times that by optimizing decisions (through improved decisioning strategies, credit risk modeling, risk-based pricing, enhanced scoring models, etc.) you will realize significant business benefits in key metrics, such as net interest margin, collections efficiency, fraud referral rates and many more.  However, given that a typical company may make more than eight million decisions per year, which decisions should one focus on to deliver the greatest business benefit? In working with our clients, Experian has compiled the following list of relevant types of decisions that can be improved through improvements in decision analytics.  As you review the list below, you should identify those decisions that are relevant to your organization, and then determine which decision types would warrant the greatest opportunity for improvement. • Cross-sell determination • Prospect determination • Prescreen decision • Offer/treatment determination • Fraud determination • Approve/decline decision • Initial credit line/limit/usage amount • Initial pricing determination • Risk-based pricing • NSF pay/no-pay decision • Over-limit/shadow limit authorization • Credit line/limit/usage/ management • Retention decisions • Loan/payment modification • Repricing determination • Predelinquency treatment • Early/late-stage delinquency treatment • Collections agency placement • Collection/recovery treatment  

I have already commented on “secret questions” as the root of all evil when considering tools to reduce identity theft and minimize fraud losses.  No, I’m not quite ready to jump off  that soapbox….not just yet, not when we’re deep into the season of holiday deals, steals and fraud.  The answers to secret questions are easily guessed, easily researched, or easily forgotten.  Is this the kind of security you want standing between your account and a fraudster during the busiest shopping time of the year? There is plenty of research demonstrating that fraud rates spike during the holiday season.  There is also plenty of research to demonstrate that fraudsters perpetrate account takeover by changing the pin, address, or e-mail address of an account – activities that could be considered risky behavior in decisioning strategies.  So, what is the best approach to identity theft red flags and fraud account management?  A risk based authentication approach, of course! Knowledge Based Authentication (KBA) provides strong authentication and can be a part of a multifactor authentication environment without a negative impact on the consumer experience, if the purpose is explained to the consumer.  Let’s say a fraudster is trying to change the pin or e-mail address of an account.  When one of these risky behaviors is initiated, a Knowledge Based Authentication session begins. To help minimize fraud, the action is prevented if the KBA session is failed.  Using this same logic, it is possible to apply a risk based authentication approach to overall account management at many points of the lifecycle: • Account funding • Account information change (pin, e-mail, address, etc.) • Transfers or wires • Requests for line/limit increase • Payments • Unusual account activity • Authentication before engaging with a fraud alert representative Depending on the risk management strategy, additional methods may be combined with KBA; such as IVR or out-of-band authentication, and follow-up contact via e-mail, telephone or postal mail.  Of course, all of this ties in with what we would consider to be a comprehensive Red Flag Rules program. Risk based authentication, as part of a fraud account management strategy, is one of the best ways we know to ensure that customers aren’t left singing, “On the first day of Christmas, the fraudster stole from me…”  

For the past couple years, the deterioration of the real estate market and the economy as a whole has been widely reported as a national and international crisis. There are several significant events that have contributed to this situation, such as, 401k plans have fallen, homeowners have simply abandoned their now under-valued properties, and the federal government has raced to save the banking and automotive sectors. While the perspective of most is that this is a national decline, this is clearly a situation where the real story is in the details. A closer look reveals that while there are places that have experienced serious real estate and employment issues (California, Florida, Michigan, etc.), there are also areas (Texas) that did not experience the same deterioration in the same manner. Flash forward to November, 2009 – with signs of recovery seemingly beginning to appear on the horizon – there appears to be a great deal of variability between areas that seem poised for recovery and those that are continuing down the slope of decline. Interestingly though, this time the list of usual suspects is changing. In a recent article posted to CNN.com, Julianne Pepitone observes that many cities that were tops in foreclosure a year ago have since shown stabilization, while at the same time, other cities have regressed. A related article outlines a growing list of cities that, not long ago, considered themselves immune from the problems being experienced in other parts of the country. Previous economic success stories are now being identified as economic laggards and experiencing the same pains, but only a year or two later. So – is there a lesson to be taken from this? From a business intelligence perspective, the lesson is generalized reporting information and forecasting capabilities are not going to be successful in managing risk. Risk management and forecasting techniques will need to be developed around specific macro- and micro-economic changes.  They will also need to incorporate a number of economic scenarios to properly reflect the range of possible future outcomes about risk management and risk management solutions. Moving forward, it will be vital to understand the differences in unemployment between Dallas and Houston and between regions that rely on automotive manufacturing and those with hi-tech jobs. These differences will directly impact the performance of lenders’ specific footprints, as this year’s “Best Place to Live” according to Money.CNN.com can quickly become next year’s foreclosure capital. ihttp://money.cnn.com/2009/10/28/real_estate/foreclosures_worst_cities/index.htm?postversion=2009102811 iihttp://money.cnn.com/galleries/2009/real_estate/0910/gallery.foreclosures_worst_cities/2.html  

By: Tom Hannagan Understanding RORAC and RAROC I was hoping someone would ask about these risk management terms…and someone did. The obvious answer is that the “A” and the “O” are reversed. But, there’s more to it than that. First, let’s see how the acronyms were derived. RORAC is Return on Risk-Adjusted Capital. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. Both of these five-letter abbreviations are a step up from ROE. This is natural, I suppose, since ROE, meaning Return on Equity of course, is merely a three-letter profitability ratio. A serious breakthrough in risk management and profit performance measurement will have to move up to at least six initials in its abbreviation. Nonetheless, ROE is the jumping-off point towards both RORAC and RAROC. ROE is generally Net Income divided by Equity, and ROE has many advantages over Return on Assets (ROA), which is Net Income divided by Average Assets. I promise, really, no more new acronyms in this post. The calculations themselves are pretty easy. ROA tends to tell us how effectively an organization is generating general ledger earnings on its base of assets.  This used to be the most popular way of comparing banks to each other and for banks to monitor their own performance from period to period. Many bank executives in the U.S. still prefer to use ROA, although this tends to be those at smaller banks. ROE tends to tell us how effectively an organization is taking advantage of its base of equity, or risk-based capital. This has gained in popularity for several reasons and has become the preferred measure at medium and larger U.S. banks, and all international banks. One huge reason for the growing popularity of ROE is simply that it is not asset-dependent. ROE can be applied to any line of business or any product. You must have “assets” for ROA, since one cannot divide by zero. Hopefully your Equity account is always greater than zero. If not, well, lets just say it’s too late to read about this general topic. The flexibility of basing profitability measurement on contribution to Equity allows banks with differing asset structures to be compared to each other.  This also may apply even for banks to be compared to other types of businesses. The asset-independency of ROE can also allow a bank to compare internal product lines to each other. Perhaps most importantly, this permits looking at the comparative profitability of lines of business that are almost complete opposites, like lending versus deposit services. This includes risk-based pricing considerations. This would be difficult, if even possible, using ROA. ROE also tells us how effectively a bank (or any business) is using shareholders equity. Many observers prefer ROE, since equity represents the owners’ interest in the business. As we have all learned anew in the past two years, their equity investment is fully at-risk. Equity holders are paid last, compared to other sources of funds supporting the bank. Shareholders are the last in line if the going gets rough. So, equity capital tends to be the most expensive source of funds, carrying the largest risk premium of all funding options. Its successful deployment is critical to the profit performance, even the survival, of the bank. Indeed, capital deployment, or allocation, is the most important executive decision facing the leadership of any organization. So, why bother with RORAC or RAROC? In short, it is to take risks more fully into the process of risk management within the institution. ROA and ROE are somewhat risk-adjusted, but only on a point-in-time basis and only to the extent risks are already mitigated in the net interest margin and other general ledger numbers. The Net Income figure is risk-adjusted for mitigated (hedged) interest rate risk, for mitigated operational risk (insurance expenses) and for the expected risk within the cost of credit (loan loss provision). The big risk management elements missing in general ledger-based numbers include: market risk embedded in the balance sheet and not mitigated, credit risk costs associated with an economic downturn, unmitigated operational risk, and essentially all of the strategic risk (or business risk) associated with being a banking entity. Most of these risks are summed into a lump called Unexpected Loss (UL). Okay, so I fibbed about no more new acronyms. UL is covered by the Equity account, or the solvency of the bank becomes an issue. RORAC is Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RORAC doesn’t add much risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, but it can take into account the risk of unexpected loss. It does this, by moving beyond just book or average Equity, by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. This, in turn, makes it possible to move towards risk-based pricing at the relationship management level as well as portfolio risk management.  This equity, or capital, allocation should be based on the relative risk of unexpected loss for the different product groups. So, it’s a big step in the right direction if you want a profitability metric that goes beyond ROE in addressing risk. And, many of us do. RAROC is Risk-Adjusted Net Income divided by Allocated Capital. RAROC does add risk-adjustment to the numerator, general ledger Net Income, by taking into account the unmitigated market risk embedded in an asset or liability. RAROC, like RORAC, also takes into account the risk of unexpected loss by allocating capital, or equity, differentially to various lines of business and even specific products and clients. So, RAROC risk-adjusts both the Net Income in the numerator AND the allocated Equity in the denominator. It is a fully risk-adjusted metric or ratio of profitability and is an ultimate goal of modern risk management. So, RORAC is a big step in the right direction and RAROC would be the full step in management of risk. RORAC can be a useful step towards RAROC. RAROC takes ROE to a fully risk-adjusted metric that can be used at the entity level.  This  can also be broken down for any and all lines of business within the organization. Thence, it can be further broken down to the product level, the client relationship level, and summarized by lender portfolio or various market segments. This kind of measurement is invaluable for a highly leveraged business that is built on managing risk successfully as much as it is on operational or marketing prowess.